Abstract
The growing convergence of Information Technology and Operational Technology has enhanced communication and visibility across power grids. This, coupled with the growing use of Distributed Energy Resources in power grids, has enhanced the grid capabilities while also creating a larger attack surface for malicious actors. A common protocol vulnerable to these attacks is the IEC-61850 GOOSE protocol due to its low-latency requirements, multicast packet delivery method, and lack of encryption. In this paper, we evaluate the security implications of different hardware implementations of this protocol by contrasting device response and recovery of two commercial off-the-shelf Intelligent Electronic Devices from separate manufacturers. The cyberattacks utilized in this paper are research-established GOOSE attacks with results measured in device latency and GOOSE endpoint response success.
Kalyan Perumalla
R&D Manager
Kalyan Perumalla is an R&D Manager with 25 years of experience. As a Federal Program Manager in Advanced Scientific Computing Research at the U.S. Dept. of Energy, Office of Science, Kalyan Perumalla manages a $100-million R&D portfolio covering AI, HPC, Quantum, SciDAC, and Basic Computer Science. He previously led advanced R&D as Distinguished Research Staff Member at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) developing scalable software and applications on the world’s largest supercomputers for 17 years, including as a line manager and a founding group leader. He has held senior faculty and adjunct appointments at UTK, GT, and UNL, and was an IAS Fellow at Durham University.